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Abstract. Management of damaging invasive plants is often undertaken by multiple
decision makers, each managing only a small part of the invader’s population. As weeds can
move between properties and re-infest eradicated sites from unmanaged sources, the dynamics
of multiple decision makers plays a significant role in weed prevalence and invasion risk at the
landscape scale. We used a spatially explicit agent-based simulation to determine how
individual agent behavior, in concert with weed population ecology, determined weed
prevalence. We compared two invasive grass species that differ in ecology, control methods,
and costs: Nassella trichotoma (serrated tussock) and Eragrostis curvula (African love grass).
The way decision makers reacted to the benefit of management had a large effect on the extent
of a weed. If benefits of weed control outweighed the costs, and either net benefit was very
large or all agents were very sensitive to net benefits, then agents tended to act synchronously,
reducing the pool of infested agents available to spread the weed. As N. trichotoma was more
damaging than E. curvula and had more effective control methods, agents chose to manage it
more often, which resulted in lower prevalence of N. trichotoma. A relatively low number of
agents who were intrinsically less motivated to control weeds led to increased prevalence of
both species. This was particularly apparent when long-distance dispersal meant each infested
agent increased the invasion risk for a large portion of the landscape. In this case, a small
proportion of land mangers reluctant to control, regardless of costs and benefits, could lead to
the whole landscape being infested, even when local control stopped new infestations. Social
pressure was important, but only if it was independent of weed prevalence, suggesting that
early access to information, and incentives to act on that information, may be crucial in
stopping a weed from infesting large areas. The response of our model to both behavioral and
ecological parameters was highly nonlinear. This implies that the outcomes of weed
management programs that deal with multiple land mangers could be highly variable in
both space and through time.
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INTRODUCTION
Damaging invasive plants (henceforth called weeds)
cause yield losses in crops and livestock (e.g., Cousens
1985, Firn 2009) and alter ecosystem functions (Le
Maitre et al. 1996) and disturbance regimes (D’Antonio
and Vitousek 1992), and thus are worth direct expendi-
ture on control. When the strategy and timing of weed
management is controlled by one decision maker, e.g.,
within a single farm, there is a well-developed body of
literature relevant to local weed management (e.g.,
Doyle 1997, Hamill et al. 2004). However, every
widespread weed in the world exists across property
boundaries, and as a result, no single land manager has
access to the entire population. This makes it imperative
to understand how human behavior affects coordination
of local management efforts, and subsequently, persis-
tence and spread of weeds at landscape scales (Shogren
2000). We use the term ‘‘decentralized weed control’’ to
refer to situations where the decisions of many
independent actors affect the weed population.
Previous work has conceptualized decentralized weed
control as a problem of external costs (e.g., Jones and
Campbell 2000), where the actions of one individual
impose uncompensated costs on others. Because these
studies are mainly from the economic literature, they
focus on how ecological processes, such a spread, affect
what actions people take and how much benefit they
derive from those actions. We turn this question on its
head and ask how people’s actions, and the benefits they
get from those actions, influence the spread of a weed
and its prevalence in the landscape.
Due to the complexity and relatively large scale of
decentralized weed control, models have often been used
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to gain general insights. Decentralized weed control can
be modeled as a weakest link public goods game, where
each land manager can pay to adopt good weed control
practices that lower the infestation risk for everybody,
and those that do not (the ‘‘weak links’’) have the
potential to infest many others (Perrings et al. 2002).
Both laboratory experiments and models consistently
find that groups playing weakest link public goods
games are strongly attracted to one of two stable
equilibria, either everybody cooperates or no one does
(Knez and Camerer 1994, Devetag and Ortmann 2007,
Hennessy 2008). More complicated bio-economic mod-
els that incorporate human decision making and forest
dynamics show similar behavior. In these models, the
actions of one decision maker can cascade through the
whole system, causing synchronized deforestation, even
when keeping the forest would have benefited everyone
(Satake et al. 2007). Both these results suggest that
social behavior in relation to weed control might be
highly nonlinear.
Nonlinear behaviors like positive feedbacks and
multiple stable states imply that under the right
conditions a few land managers who do not control
weeds can have dramatic impacts at scales far larger
than the area they manage. Because different land
managers have different economic goals and/or produc-
tion systems, some land managers will be less motivated
to control a given weed than others. Also, because weed
populations generally exist at scales far greater than
individual properties, even if all agents are willing and
able to control the weed, failure to synchronize efforts
can allow the weed to persist (Gonzalez-Andujar et al.
2001). Social pressure between decision makers can
encourage them to act more uniformly by reinforcing
the socially approved behavior (Milinski et al. 2006,
Iwasa et al. 2007, 2010). Anecdotally, land managers
report that social pressure influences weed control
decisions (Anonymous 2009a, Holman et al. 2010),
suggesting that this may be an important (but often
unquantified) force shaping weed dynamics at the
landscape level.
Our goal was to test how the prevalence of weeds was
affected by three aspects of human behavior (social
pressure, profit seeking, and ability to perceive and act
on expected returns) and their interaction with ecolog-
ical traits affecting a weed’s ability to persist and spread
to new properties. We also tested if a small minority of
agents with less motivation to control at the property
scale could affect weed spread at the landscape scale. We
used a spatially explicit agent-based simulation where
each agent was a property manager. Agent-based
simulations provided a flexible and intuitive framework
in which to combine spatially explicit decision making
and ecological processes. We also developed a mean field
approximation as a check that the results of our
simulation were not due to stochasticity or arbitrary
modeling decisions such as process scheduling and
landscape size. We compared the behavior of the model
for two different types of weeds with varying impact and
control costs: Nassella trichotoma (serrated tussock),
which is very damaging, and Eragrostis curvula (African
lovegrass), which is less damaging.
METHODS
Study species
We parameterized economic impact and the manage-
ment costs and effectiveness for two widespread and
damaging weeds of Australian pastoral areas, where
weed control is often decentralized: Nassella trichotoma
(serrated tussock) and Eragrostis curvula (African love-
grass). Both species can dominate pastures and are
relatively unpalatable, significantly reducing stocking
rates. There are, however, important differences between
them. N. trichotoma has been recognized as a serious
problem since at least 1937 (Campbell and Vere 1995),
and there are now established strategies for its control
(Michelmore 2003). It often does not flower in its first
year (Parson and Cuthbertson 2001), giving managers a
relatively long period to find and spot spray new plants
before they produce seed. Eradication is possible (Miller
1998), but likely to take decades as seed banks may last
up to 23 years (Lamoureaux and Bourdot 2004).
Quarantine and preventative measures for N. trichotoma
appear to be relatively effective (Campbell and Vere
1995).
In contrast, E. curvula was repeatedly introduced as a
pasture species up until the 1980s (Johnston et al. 1984),
and with intensive management it does have some value
as feed (Roberts and Carbon 1969). However, in many
areas, E. curvula is a damaging weed (Firn 2009). As it
has only recently been recognized as a serious problem,
management strategies for E. curvula are much less
developed. Less effective management combined with
the fact that it can produce seed only a few months after
germination means that eradication of established
populations is currently not feasible (Firn 2009). A
short time to seed production also means that spot
spraying new plants to stop the weed from establishing is
very difficult. However, the use of quarantine areas has
been shown to be effective as the seeds disperse very
poorly if unassisted by animals or machinery (Firn
2009). There are, therefore, some effective preventative
measures land managers can take to reduce the chances
of establishment, but they appear to be limited
compared to those employed against N. trichotoma.
We included these differences between N. trichotoma
and E. curvula through differences in probability of
eradication, h, effectiveness of preventative measures, l,
and the utility of being in state j, uj, which defines impact
and management costs (see Table 1 for values and Table
2 for further definitions).
We used a series of case studies from Meat and
Livestock Australia and Australian Wool Innovation
Limited (Anonymous 2009a, b) to parameterize the
impact and management costs for these two species.
Individual property managers who had one of these
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weeds on their property were asked how much they
believed it reduced yield, how much it cost to control or
mitigate, and how optimistic they were about eradicat-
ing the weed. These case studies were not a random
sample; they were anecdotal accounts from a subset of
property managers with a proactive approach to weed
control. The case studies take into account the costs and
benefits of simultaneous management strategies, such as
using herbicides along with grazing management,
growing supplementary feed through cultivation, and
quarantine measures. Costs from the case studies are
shown in Table 1.
For all case studies, controlling was more profitable
than being invaded because control efforts allowed
stocking rates to partially recover, which more than
offset the costs of control. Being vigilant and eradicating
populations early was always more profitable than
controlling established populations. This was because
most vigilance strategies entailed similar elements to
control strategies (e.g., checking paddocks and spot
spraying any new seedlings), and as there were far fewer
plants to control when the population was very new and
not yet established, herbicide and labor costs were lower.
Model development
We modeled interactions between the ecological,
economic, and social forces that shape weed invasions
by simulating a lattice of simple decision-making agents.
Each agent could change state through the ecological
processes of invasion and eradication, or by deciding to
control or taking preventative measures. All parameter
combinations tested were simulated 1000 times. We
developed a mean field approximation of the simulation
that holds when dispersal is random with respect to
distance (see Appendix). Unlike the simulation, the
mean field approximation was not stochastic, used an
infinite landscape, and was solved in continuous time.
TABLE 1. Costs of being in each state relative to being
susceptible (represented by uXk), probability of eradication
(h), and effectiveness of vigilance (l ) for each case study
(Anonymous 2009a, b.
Parameter
and case
Nassella
trichotoma
Eragrostis
curvula
uV
Case 1 0.99 0.85
Case 2 0.92 0.97
Case 3 0.99 0.87
uI
Case 1 0.5 0.7
Case 2 0.5 0.9
Case 3 0.5 0.67
uC
Case 1 0.96 0.8
Case 2 0.82 0.93
Case 3 0.89 0.74
h 0.039 0
l 0.2 0.5
Notes: See Table 2 for an explanation of parameters. It was
not always possible to ascertain the relative profit of all states,
but it was always possible to determine the ranking of profit
relative to the other states (S, susceptible; I, infested; C,
controlling; and V, vigilant). When a value could not be
calculated directly from information in the case studies, two
simple rules were used: First, if uV was unknown, then uV¼ (uC
þ 1)/2; second, if uC was unknown, then uC¼ uV 0.1. Values
marked with a dagger () were set using these rules. Utility
values used to generate plots in the results section are italicized,
all tests were done on all three case studies for each species, and
results did not differ substantially between case studies.
TABLE 2. Table of parameters, their values (if constant across time steps), and their interpretation.
Parameter Value, if constant Interpretation
Xk the state of agent k
uj see Table 1 the utility or profit of being in state j compared with state S
l see Table 1 the effect of being vigilant on invasion risk: l ¼ 0 means vigilance confers perfect
protection from invasion, l ¼ 1 means vigilance confers no protection
a varies between 0 and 5,
depending on test
a shape constant that controls how deterministic the decision model is. Larger a ¼
more deterministic
q varies between 0 and 0.5,
depending on test
the proportion of the utility received in state S an agent was willing to give up to
control or be vigilant, regardless of the state of any other agents in the landscape
y varies between 0 and 0.5,
depending on test
coefficient modifying the strength of social pressure imposed by an agent’s neighbors
rk;Xk the probability agent k will get invaded if they are in state Xk
bk,m the probability that if agent m had weeds they would infest agent k within one time
step
b dependent on test the probability that an infested agent would create one new infestation in a
susceptible agent within one time step
w dependent on test proportion of infestations spawned in non-nearest neighbors
di,j Kronenker’s d, which is 1 when i ¼ j
aj!i,k the probability that agent k will choose to move from state j to state i within one time
step
hk 0 or 5 difference in perceived benefit of vigilance or control between motivated and
unmotivated agents
bj!i,k the benefit of moving from state j to state i for agent k
E[Rk jXk] expected return for agent k given they are in state Xk
h see Table 1 the probability that a controlling agent will successfully eradicate the weed
Nk 8 or 4095 the set of agent k’s neighbors (see Fig. 2)
M 4095 number of agents in the landscape excluding the focal agent k
April 2013 525WEED SPREAD IN HUMAN–ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
State variables and scales
Our landscape was a 64 3 64 cell lattice with wrap-
around boundaries; each cell represented a single
property controlled by a decision-making agent. Xk
was a state variable that held the state of agent k. Each
agent could be in one of four states; infested (Xk ¼ I),
controlling (Xk ¼ C), susceptible (Xk ¼ S), and vigilant
(Xk ¼ V). Infested agents had the weed and did not
control it. We assumed that once established, the weed
never went extinct without management, thus agents
could only move from I to C. Controlling agents had the
weed and undertook management to reduce and/or
eventually eliminate the weed. Susceptible agents were
weed free and carried out no management. Vigilant
agents were weed free and took steps, such as paddock
inspections and spot spraying with herbicides, to reduce
the probability of the weed establishing (See Fig. 1 for
possible transitions). Agents changed their state by
either becoming invaded, eradicating the weed, or
deciding to control or be vigilant based on their own
state and the state of others in the lattice. We assumed
that control activities stopped the weed from spreading,
for example, by greatly reducing seed set.
The simulation was run for 200 one-year time steps;
considered an appropriate timescale for these pastoral
systems because eradication on individual properties can
take decades. After 200 time steps, the proportion of
agents in each state was averaged over the last five time
steps and recorded.
Design concepts
Agents used the profit of being in each state, the
probability of invasion or eradication, and social pressure
to calculate the expected benefit of moving to a new state.
Social pressure had three components: (1) internal social
pressure to ‘‘do the right thing’’ (q), which was
independent of the weed’s frequency; (2) because rein-
forcement from multiple peers makes changing behavior
more likely (Centola and Macy 2007), external social
pressure, applied from weed-free neighbors, was added to
internal social pressure, after being scaled by the social
pressure coefficient, y; and (3) we assumed an agent’s
neighbors were more likely to apply social pressure when
they were themselves threatened with infestation. We
made the amount of social pressure each neighbor applied
proportional to the frequency of weeds among their
neighbors, similar to Eq. 1 in Iwasa et al. (2007; See Fig. 2
for an explanation of neighbor’s neighbors).
FIG. 1. Transition probabilities between weed states:
susceptible (S), infested (I), controlling (C), and vigilant (V).
Within one time step, agents can: (a) change state through
ecological processes, making one move up (with probability of
eradication, h) or down (with probability of infestation, rk;Xk¼j );
or (b) decide whether to change their behavior and move from
state j with probability aj!i,k. Agents can also remain in any of
the states (not shown). Further details of transition probabil-
ities and term definitions are given in Table 2.
FIG. 2. Schematic representation of neighbors and neigh-
bors’ neighbors. The neighborhood is a very important concept
in our model. When agents chose to control or be vigilant about
weeds, they took into account the social pressure applied to
them by their neighbors. We called the set of agent k’s neighbors
Nk in this figure; Nk is indexed by the variable g. How much
social pressure each neighbor applied to agent k depended on
the frequency of weeds among their own neighbors. Following
the same notation, the set of each neighbor’s neighbors was
called Ng. You can see that agent k (black box) is also in Ng¼1’s
neighborhood, and although not shown, agent k is also in the
neighborhoods of all its neighbors, because any agent is its
neighbors’ neighbor. We can see that agents also share
neighbors; for example, agent g ¼ 2 is a neighbor to agent k
(i.e., it is in the setNk), and is also a neighbor to agent g¼1 (i.e.,
it is also in the set Ng¼1). For clarity, only two neighborhoods
are shown, Nk and Ng¼1, but all g have neighborhoods like that
of Ng¼1. Here we show a neighborhood size jNkj ¼ 8; the
simulation was also tested with jNkj ¼ 4095.
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In weed management there is an incentive to ‘‘free
ride,’’ i.e., put less effort into weed prevention because
the weed management of others lowers one’s invasion
risk. The free-rider incentive was included in the model
by incorporating invasion risk into the cost benefit
calculation for being vigilant or susceptible (Eqs. 5 and
6). At each time step, weed-free agents decided to be
vigilant or susceptible, and if the actions of their
neighbors lowered the invasion risk enough they decided
to be susceptible, which was more beneficial when
invasion risk was lower.
Imperfect ability to perceive and act on economic and
social information can be approximated by making the
decision rule more stochastic (Satake et al. 2007).
Differences in production systems and economic goals
mean that some land managers will see more value in
being weed free than others. We modeled differences in
the perceived value of weed management by shifting
‘‘unmotivated’’ agents’ decision curves relative to the
decision curves of ‘‘motivated’’ agents. Unmotivated
agents’ decision curves for control and vigilance were
shifted to the right (Fig. 3), and their decision curves for
being susceptible and infested to the left. Thus,
unmotivated agents needed more benefit to have the
same probability of deciding to control or be vigilant
and less benefit to have the same probability of deciding
to be susceptible or infested. Generally, we ran our
model using two social settings: ‘‘good neighbors,’’
where there were no unmotivated agents and ‘‘small
minority,’’ where 10% of agents were unmotivated. We
also tested the model with 1% of agents unmotivated,
but the results did not differ substantially from the
good-neighbor setting. Model runs that did not use these
two social settings are made clear. Agents’ transitions
between states were decided stochastically using a biased
coin toss.
We examined three dispersal scenarios: random,
nearest-neighbor, and combined dispersal. Under ran-
dom dispersal, infested agents could spread weeds to any
other weed-free agent in the lattice. This describes
situations such as long-distance seed movement by road,
which is a factor in the spread of N. trichotoma and E.
curvula (Parson and Cuthbertson 2001, Firn 2009). In
the nearest-neighbor scenario, infested agents could only
spread weeds to their eight immediate neighbors. This is
applicable when seed dispersal is more closely linked
with distance (i.e., natural dispersal vectors predomi-
nate). In reality, some seeds go to neighbors and others
travel long distances. In the combined scenario, infested
agents spawned 90% of new infestations in their eight
immediate neighbors, and spawned 10% in randomly
chosen agents. The 90/10 split is arbitrary due to a lack
of data about seed transport for our two focal species.
We tested other nearest-neighbor/random dispersal
splits and runs that did not use a 90/10 split are made
clear. Our goal was to examine how social and economic
pressure, in combination with different types of weed
dispersal, might influence invasion dynamics.
Initialization
At the beginning of each run of 200 time steps, 1% of
cells were randomly selected to be infested, and the rest
were set to susceptible. The specified number of
unmotivated agents (generally 0 or 10% of agents) were
randomly assigned. Agents that were set to unmotivated
stayed unmotivated for all 200 time steps.
Process overview and scheduling
(1) First, the ecological processes of infestation and
eradication took place; susceptible and vigilant agents
got infested with probability rk;Xk , and controlling agents
eradicated the weed with probability h (Fig. 1a). (2)
Based on the resulting landscape, agents with the weed
decided if they controlled or not, and those without the
weed decided to be susceptible or vigilant (Fig. 1b).
Sub-models
Both decision and infestation probabilities were
dynamic, but for convenience we drop the time subscript
as these probabilities only ever referred to the current
time step. The simulation was written with Java SE 6
(Oracle Technology Network 2006).
Infestation and eradication.—Susceptible or vigilant
agents became infested with the following probabilities:
rk;Xk¼S ¼ 1
Ym¼M
m¼1
ð1 bk;mdXm ;IÞ ð1aÞ
rk;Xk¼V ¼ 1
Ym¼M
m¼1
ð1 bk;mdXm;IÞ
 !
l ð1bÞ
FIG. 3. Examples of the logit decision model in Eq. 4. The
probability of an agent moving from state j to state i is a
function of the benefit of making such a move (Eq. 5), and the
difference in perceived value of weed control between motivated
and unmotivated agents, hk.
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where rk;Xkwas the probability agent k got invaded if they
were susceptible (Xk¼S; Eq. 1a) or vigilant (Xk¼V; Eq.
1b), where there were M other agents in the landscape
(M ¼ 64 3 64  1 ¼ 4095). Parameter l (Eq. 1b)
determined how effectively vigilance stopped infestation,
and 0  l  1 was always true. When l¼ 0, it meant that
vigilance always stopped infestation, and l ¼ 1 meant
that vigilance had no effect on infestation risk.
Kronecker’s delta:
di;j ¼ 1 if i ¼ j0 if i 6¼ j

ð2Þ
ensured that only infested agents could give the weed to
agent k. Recall that for infested agents, Xk¼ I, thus dXm;I
¼ 1 only when agent m is infested and is 0 if agent m is
susceptible, vigilant, or controlling (i.e., Xk¼ S, V, or C,
respectively). Parameter bk,m (Eq. 3) is the probability
that if agent m had the weed they would infest agent k:
bk;m
¼
bð1 wÞ
8
if agents k and m are nearest neighbors
bw
ðM  8Þ otherwise ð3Þ
8>><
>>:
where b (note no subscript) is the probability that an
infested agent will infest one susceptible agent in one
turn. For example, b ¼ 0.5 meant each infested agent
would create, on average, one new infestation every two
years. Holding b constant across the three dispersal
scenarios stopped the distribution of dispersal (i.e.,
where new infestations occurred) being confounded with
the number of new infestations per infested agent. The
proportion of infestations that occur in nearest neigh-
bors (evenly divided among the eight nearest neighbors)
is 1  w, and w is the proportion of infestations that
occur in any other agent in the landscape (evenly divided
among the M  8 other agents in the landscape). We
made bk,m a simple-step function, which is appropriate
at the scale of properties (in this context often hundreds
to thousands of hectares in size). Weeds can ‘‘jump the
fence’’ to a neighbor without human help, using
dispersal mechanisms like wind and water (top line in
Eq. 3). For our focal species, seed dispersal of more than
one kilometer by these mechanisms is rare. Further,
because dispersal kernels are flat in the tails, the
destination of far-dispersing seeds is almost independent
of distance. Thus, it is unlikely a seed will be dispersed
all the way across a neighboring property without
human help, and if it does, it could disperse almost
anywhere in the landscape. Also, very long-distance
dispersal (tens to hundreds of kilometers) is often the
result of accidental seed movement by road; farm
machinery and transported stock are commonly cited
vectors (Parson and Cuthbertson 2001, Firn 2009). To
capture these processes, we modeled very long-distance
dispersal seed dispersal as random with respect to
distance (i.e., the seed could go anywhere on the
landscape; bottom line of Eq. 3). For the nearest-
neighbor dispersal scenario w ¼ 0, for combined
dispersal, we assumed w¼0.1, and for random dispersal,
we assumed each agent had an equal chance of being
infested, thus w ¼ (M  8)/M (note that w 6¼1, because
nearest neighbors have a small chance of infestation
when dispersal is random).
If Xk¼C, then agent k could eradicate the weed with
probability h. A biased coin toss was used to apply h.
Decision model.—Following Iwasa et al. (2007), we
modeled the probability that agent k decided to move
from their current state j to state i, aj!i,k (Eq. 4), using a
logit decision model (example shown in Fig. 3). There is
a long history of using logit decision models to describe
how groups of people change their decisions in
economics (McFadden 1981) and game theory (Hof-
bauer and Sigmund 2003). Logit decision models have
the flexibility to allow all agents to make the best
response to their current invasion risk (large value of a
in Eq. 4), or for some agents to stochastically make a
suboptimal choice (lower value of a in Eq. 4) (Iwasa et
al. 2010). To make the problem tractable, each agent
only knows his current invasion risk and so decides as
though invasion risk (and by extension, the state of the
landscape) will stay constant:
aj!i;k ¼ 1
1þ eabj!i;k : ð4Þ
The shape-constant a controlled how deterministic the
decision model was: If a was large, agents were more
likely to choose the option with the highest benefit
(dashed line in Fig. 3), as a got smaller, agents’ decisions
became more random with respect to benefit (solid lines
in Fig. 3), a was always non-negative. The benefit to
agent k for deciding to move from state j to state i, bj!i,k
(Eq. 5), was calculated as the difference between the
expected return of moving to new state i, E[Rk jXk ¼ i],
and the expected return of staying in the current state,
E[Rk jXk ¼ j]:
bj!i;k ¼ E½Rk j Xk ¼ i  E½Rk j Xk ¼ j: ð5Þ
If agent k expects a bigger return for deciding to change
state than staying in its current state, then bj!i,k will be
positive and the probability that they will change state,
aj!i,k (Eq. 4), will be 0.5. How much greater than 0.5
will depend on the size of bj!i,k and a. Vice versa, if
agent k expects a bigger return for staying in its current
state than changing state, then bj!i,k will be negative and
aj!i,k, will be 0.5. For simplicity, when calculating the
expected economic return, we assumed that agents were
myopic, only taking into account the expected economic
benefit from the next time step given the current state of
the landscape.
If agent k did not have the weed it could decide to be
susceptible or vigilant. Susceptible agents (Eq. 6a)
received the highest utility (recall that uS ¼ 1 . uV .
uC . uI), but also had a higher invasion risk and felt
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social pressure. Vigilant agents had a lower utility, but
also a lower risk of invasion and felt no social pressure
(Eq. 6b). Agents balanced these competing factors using
Eq. 5 and E[Rk jXk¼ j]. E[Rk jXk¼ j], was composed of
two parts: E[Rk jXk¼ j]¼ [economic return for agent k in
state j]  [social pressure on agent k in state j]. The
expected economic return for being susceptible (first set
of fences in Eq. 6a) was the utility for being susceptible,
uS (highest possible utility), weighted by the probability
that if agent k was susceptible, they would not get
invaded (1 rk;Xk¼S), plus the utility for invaded agents,
uI (lowest possible utility) weighted by the probability
that agent k would get invaded if it was susceptible
(rk;Xk¼S). The economic return for agent k deciding to be
vigilant was calculated in a similar manner (Eq. 6b); the
utility of being vigilant, uV, weighted by the probability
of not getting invaded if they were vigilant (1 rk;Xk¼V),
plus the utility of being invaded, uI, weighted by the
probability of agent k getting invaded if they were
vigilant (rk;Xk¼V). To reflect that some agents were more
motivated than others to be vigilant, agent k perceived
hk less utility for being in state V; for motivated agents,
hk ¼ 0, and for unmotivated agents, hk . 0 (difference
between solid black and gray lines in Fig. 3). Agents are
designated as either motivated or unmotivated at the
start of a run, and keep that designation through the
whole run (i.e., hk is set for each agent at the start of a
run and is constant). The final set of brackets in Eqs. 6a
and 7a is the social pressure felt by each agent for not
taking action against the weed:
E½Rk jXk ¼ S
¼

ð1 rk;Xk¼SÞ þ uIrk;Xk¼S

 qþ y 1jNkj2
X
g2Nk
dXg;V
X
n2Ng
ðdXn;I þ dXn;CÞ
2
4
3
5
0
@
1
A ð6aÞ
E½Rk j Xk ¼ V ¼ uVð1 rk;Xk¼VÞ þ uIrk;Xk¼V  hk: ð6bÞ
We assume social pressure was felt by susceptible
agents, but not vigilant ones. Thus, the expected return
for being susceptible (Eq. 6a) contains a social pressure
term in the second set of brackets, while the expected
return for being vigilant (Eq. 6b) has no social pressure
term. The social pressure term in Eq. 6a reduced the
economic benefit of being susceptible. The internal
social pressure to control the weed irrespective of the
weeds prevalence is termed q. This may be due to a
social norm to control exotic species, even if people do
not know how damaging they are. Managers’ motiva-
tion to control a weed may also change with that weed’s
prevalence. The rationale is that when a weed is very
rare, fewer people will be aware of the weed and
problems it causes. As the weed increases in prevalence,
more people learn to identify it and what damage it can
do, and so become more concerned about it and place
higher social pressure on their neighbors to control it.
To model this effect, we assumed that social pressure
increased as a linear function of total concern about the
weed among an agent’s neighbors (the two summation
terms in Eqs. 6a and 7a), with intercept q and slope y.
The slope, y, controls how strongly agents respond to
social pressure imposed by neighbors. Total concern
among neighbors had two components: the number of
agents who could apply social pressure (first summation
term) and how concerned each of those neighbors were
(second summation term). Nk was the set of all agent k’s
neighbors, with each agent in set Nk indexed by the
subscript g. Similarly, in the second summation term, Ng
is the set of each of agent g’s neighbors; that is, agent k’s
neighbors’ neighbors (see Fig. 2). Recall that di,j (Eq. 2)
is 1 if i¼ j and 0 otherwise. Thus, the double summation
term makes the amount of social pressure each vigilant
neighbor (counted with dXg,V) applied to agent k
proportional to the number of their neighbors with
weeds (counted with dXn,I and dXn,C in the second
summation term; note the change in subscript from Xg
to Xn). jNkj is the number of elements in set Nk, i.e., the
number of neighbors agent k has. We assume the
neighborhood size is the same for every agent, which
means that jNkj ¼ jNgj. We used two neighborhood sizes
throughout the paper: jNkj¼ jNgj¼8 (nearest neighbors)
and jNkj ¼ jNgj ¼ 4095 (the entire landscape). The
division term in Eq. 6a converts the count from the
double summation to a frequency.
If agent k had the weed, then it could decide between
controlling or doing nothing and being infested. For our
parameterization with N. trichotoma and E. curvula,
controlling always had a larger benefit than doing
nothing because the utility of controlling was greater
than the utility of being infested (uC . uI), and we
assumed agents that were controlling did not feel social
pressure, but infested agents did. The calculation of the
expected return for being infested (Eq. 7a) or controlling
(Eq. 7b) is similar in form to the calculation of the
expected return for being susceptible (Eq. 6a) and
vigilant (Eq. 6b), with a few minor differences, as
follows:
E½Rk jXk ¼ I
¼ uI  qþ y 1jNkj2
X
g2Nk
½ðdXg;V þ dXg;SÞ
 
3
X
n2Ng
ðdXn ;I þ dXn;CÞ
!
ð7aÞ
E½Rk j Xk ¼ C ¼ uCð1 hÞ þ h hk: ð7bÞ
We assumed that the weed never went extinct without
control, so if agent k decided not to control and be
infested, then the expected economic return was simply
the utility of being infested (first term in Eq. 7a is just
uI). E[Rk jXk ¼ C] was the expected return for a
controlling agent (Eq. 7b) given that agents get uC if
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control is unsuccessful and 1 if they succeed, which
happened with probability h. We assumed that control-
ling agents do not feel social pressure, so E[Rk jXk¼ C]
(Eq. 7b) does not have the social pressure term. For
infested agents, we assumed that both vigilant and
susceptible agents could apply social pressure, so the
second summation term contains both dXg,V and dXg,S;
recall the social pressure term in Eq. 6a only included
dXg,V. Like vigilance, some agents were more motived
than others to control, and agent k perceived hk less
utility for being in state C (for motivated agents hk¼ 0,
and for unmotivated agents hk . 0). All agents were
either motivated or unmotivated, and hk was constant
for each agent, whether they were deciding to be vigilant
or controlling.
RESULTS
The mean field approximation always produced the
same general pattern as the simulation, and there was
good agreement between the simulation and mean field
approximation over a wide range of parameter space for
all the social scenarios (lines and points are closely
matched in Figs. 4, 5, and 6). Suggesting that, for the
random dispersal scenario at least, lattice boundary
conditions, the way stochasticity was applied, and using
discrete time did not change the general results or
conclusions. While the general pattern remained similar,
there was some quantitative departure of the mean field
from simulation results for 7 out of the 32 parameter
combinations where the mean field and simulation were
compared. There was no general rule for when the
departures occurred. In Fig. 4 the mean field and
simulation only diverge when a ¼ 5 (i.e., the agents’
decisions are more deterministic). However, in Fig. 5,
only one out of eight comparisons between the mean
field and simulation diverged (solid black line and point-
up triangles in Fig. 5a) and that occurred when a¼1, for
the good-neighbor social scenario. For the 16 sets of
parameter values tested in Fig. 6, only two showed much
deviation between the mean field and simulation (dashed
lines and point-down triangles in Fig. 6d); both of these
for the small minority social scenario.
Prevalence of the weed showed the expected relation-
ship with both eradication and infestation probabilities
(h and b, respectively). The weed became less prevalent
as it became easier to eradicate (higher h) and more
prevalent as infestations became more likely (Fig. 4).
Unsurprisingly, when there were more unmotivated
agents, both E. curvula (Fig. 7a) and N. trichotoma (Fig.
7b) became more prevalent. There was an interaction
between dispersal, species, and the proportion of
unmotivated agents. As dispersal became more random,
unmotivated agents had a greater effect on weed
prevalence, and much more so for E. curvula than N.
trichotoma (steeper lines for higher values of w in Fig. 7).
Nassella trichotoma had a lower prevalence than E.
curvula after 200 time steps for all dispersal and social
scenarios (for example, compare the columns for each
species in Fig. 5). For E. curvula internal social pressure,
q, caused the proportion of agents with weeds to change
from almost 1 to 0 when there was some random
dispersal, and agents responded strongly to expected
benefit (a¼5; Fig. 5b, d). Internal social pressure, q, had
less effect on the prevalence of N. trichotoma (curves for
N. trichotoma in Fig. 5 are relatively flat). When there
was a significant difference between social scenarios,
FIG. 4. The proportion of agents either infested with or
controlling weeds for different values of (a) eradication
probability, h, and (b) infestation probability, b, for the random
dispersal scenario under more stochastic (a ¼ 1) and more
deterministic (a ¼ 5) decisions (see Fig. 2). Vertical lines show
the 95% confidence intervals for the simulation. For both panels,
q¼ 0, y¼ 0.5, and l¼ 0.5. For panel (a), b is equivalent to each
infested agent infesting, on average, one new susceptible agent
every 10 time steps; for panel (b), h is equivalent to a controlling
agent eradicating the weed, on average, once every 20 time steps.
On the x-axis of panel (b), b is equivalent to each infested agent
infesting, on average, one susceptible agent every 10 (minimum)
and 2 (maximum) time steps. The cost structure used is from
case study 1 for Eragrostis curvula, shown in Table 1.
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weeds had a higher prevalence in the landscape under
the small minority scenario (point-down triangles).
As expected, random dispersal produced the highest
prevalence of weeds for a given social scenario, followed
by combined dispersal, with nearest-neighbor dispersal
having the lowest proportion of weeds. The social
scenario used had a greater effect on the proportion of
agents with weeds when the dispersal scenario became
more random, compare Fig. 5b, d, and f (a ¼ 5; gray).
There were strong interactions between decision
parameters; for example, how deterministically agents
responded to benefits, a, changed the way internal social
pressure influenced the prevalence of weeds in the
landscape for several scenarios, especially for E. curvula.
In Fig. 5b, d, and f, when decisions were more stochastic
(a ¼ 1), internal social pressure had little effect on the
proportion of agents with weeds. When decisions were
more benefit driven (a ¼ 5), increasing internal social
pressure caused large declines in the proportion of
agents with weeds.
Although management and impact costs (incorporat-
ed through uj) made some difference to weed prevalence
(Fig. 6a is similar to Fig. 6c, and Fig. 6b is similar to Fig.
6d), it was differences in eradication probability, h, and
effectiveness of vigilance, l, that really drove the
different outcomes for N. trichotoma and E. curvula
FIG. 5. The effect of internal social pressure (q) on the proportion of agents with weeds (states I and C) for (a, b) random (w¼
[8M]/M ), (c, d) combined (w¼ 0.1), and (e, f ) nearest-neighbor dispersal (w¼ 0) for both N. trichotoma and E. curvula, for the
good-neighbor (no unmotivated agents) and small minority (10% of agents unmotivated) social scenarios; y¼ 0.5 and b¼ 0.33 for
all plots. Vertical lines show 95% confidence intervals. Values of h and l, and the cost structures for case study 1 shown in Table 1
were used.
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(Fig. 6a and d are dissimilar, despite having the same
impact and management costs, as are Fig. 6b and c).
For E. curvula (Fig. 6b), the prevalence of weeds was
high as a increased from 0, then, when agents responded
to benefit strongly enough the prevalence of the weed
started to drop off. For the good-neighbor scenario
(point-up triangles), E. curvula prevalence decreased
quickly with increasing a, and reached a low level when
agents responded strongly to benefit (a ¼ 5). For the
small minority scenario (point-down triangles), the
proportion of agents with E. curvula did not start to
decrease until a was higher, and the decline was not as
steep. The proportion of agents with N. trichotoma, on
the other hand (Fig. 6a), dropped quickly as a increased
from 0, and then leveled off.
There was an interaction between agents’ response to
benefit, a, infestation probability, b, and social scenario.
In the good-neighbor scenario, increasing infestation
probability, b, pushed the curves in Fig. 6 to the right;
thus, at higher infestation rates, the same proportion of
infested agents could still be achieved, but agents had to
respond to benefits more strongly. Under the small
minority scenario, increasing b raised the curves in Fig.
6; thus, higher infestation rates meant a higher
proportion of agents with the weed for every value of
a tested.
DISCUSSION
When a high proportion of dispersal was random,
unmotivated agents could adversely affect every other
FIG. 6. The proportion of agents with weeds (states I and C) across different values of a, for the random dispersal scenario for
(a) N. trichotoma and (b) E. curvula. To show the effects of cost structure and ease of management separately, panel (c) shows
results for the h and l values of N. trichotoma and cost structure of E. curvula, and panel (d) shows the h and l values of E. curvula
and cost structure of N. trichotoma. The b values correspond to an infested agent infesting a susceptible neighbor, on average, once
every three (black) and five (gray) time steps. The cost structures and values of h and l used for each species are shown in Table 1
(case study 1); q ¼ y ¼ 0.5 in all plots.
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agent in the landscape. As a result, unmotivated agents
had a much larger effect on weed spread when dispersal
was independent of distance (e.g., more seed transport
by road). Long-distance dispersal is common among
invasive plants (Theoharides and Dukes 2007), suggest-
ing that in many cases unmotivated decision makers will
be important drivers of weed invasions. This supports
existing theory, which predicts that outcomes of public-
goods problems are more strongly based on the
‘‘weakest links’’ when a large number of players interact
(Perrings et al. 2002).
In contrast, we expect that if there is a strong incentive
to manage a weed, then unmotivated land managers will
have limited effects at the landscape scale. Unmotivated
agents in our simulation had a much larger effect on the
spread of E. curvula than N. trichotoma. Because N.
trichotoma was much more damaging than E. curvula,
and had more effective management options, agents
acted against N. trichotoma more consistently. As a
result unmotivated agents were less likely to be infested
by N. trichotoma in the first place, and when they were
infested their neighbors were more likely to control or be
vigilant, reducing the impact of the unmotivated agents
on the rest of the landscape.
Agents’ behavior was an important influence on weed
spread rates, and was influenced by the characteristics of
the weed. In our example, N. trichotoma was econom-
ically damaging and management was relatively effec-
tive, thus, most decision makers took control or
vigilance measures on economic grounds, and social
pressure was less important. In contrast, decision
makers had less economic incentive for either vigilance
or control against E. curvula, and the extra motivation
provided by social pressure was important in encourag-
ing agents to manage the weed. This suggests that social
pressure may only be a factor in the spread of a small
subset of invasive species, those that are not so
damaging, or easy to manage that people control them
solely on economic grounds; or those so benign that
people do not consider them weeds.
Early management is crucial for cost-effective weed
management (Davies and Sheley 2007). Social norms
(represented in our model as internal social pressure)
and economic cost were effective at encouraging early
management. This is why increased internal social
pressure was effective against E. curvula, even though
this species could not be eradicated (recall we assumed
controlling agents could not infest others). For decision
makers to control a weed, even when it is at very low
levels in the landscape, the weed must be identified as
damaging before anyone in the local area has experi-
enced it. This will be a reasonable assumption when a
species is already a problem in other areas. Local
governments routinely provide information on potential
weeds and their control options to land managers; for
example, California’s Plant Health and Pest Prevention
Services (information available online).5 However, just
giving land managers information does not mean they
will use it (Gardener et al. 2010), and when they do not,
more proactive strategies will be required. One approach
is to pay managers to be vigilant or control regardless of
the weed’s prevalence (Pokorny and Krueger-Mangold
2007).
When the benefits of controlling a weed were obvious
(as for N. trichotoma in our model), or when agents
responded strongly to benefits, most agents undertook
FIG. 7. The proportion of agents either infested or
controlling weeds (y-axis) under different proportions of
unmotivated agents (x-axis) for (a) Eragrostis curvula and (b)
Nassella trichotoma. Points show the mean of 1000 simulations,
vertical lines show 95% confidence limits, and joining lines
connect points in the same series. Each series shows the results
for a different split of random and nearest-neighbor dispersal,
and the proportion of random dispersal is shown in the right
margin: w ¼ 0 is the nearest-neighbor scenario, w ¼ 0.1 is the
combined scenario, and w ¼ (M  8)/M (rounded up to 1, for
display) is the random-dispersal scenario. For all simulations b
¼ 0.33; i.e., on average, each infested agent could infest one
susceptible agent every three time steps. Values of h and l, and
the cost structures for case 1 shown in Table 1 were used, and q
¼ y¼ 0.5.
5 www.cdfa.ca.gov/phpps/
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management synchronously, reducing the infested area.
If, on the other hand, agents did not respond strongly to
benefits, stochasticity in decision making ensured that
there were enough susceptible and infested agents to
sustain the invasion. This result shows that even
temporarily uncontrolled infestations can sustain an
invasion, provided there are enough of them at any one
time. It should be noted that a landscape full of
informed and responsive decision makers will not
necessarily have few weeds. If the individual costs of
weed control or prevention are greater than the benefit,
then responsive decision makers will not act in the
community interest (Satake et al. 2007).
All of our results indicate that the response of spread
to both human behavior and a weed’s characteristics are
nonlinear. Other ecological–economic models have
shown similar threshold behavior caused by feedback
between decision-making agents (Iwasa et al. 2007,
Satake et al. 2007). Nonlinear behaviors (particularly
thresholds) appear to be a common feature in ecolog-
ical–economic systems with multiple agents. This will
make the outcome of decentralized weed management
less predictable at landscape scales, as small manage-
ment interventions (such as imposing fines) may or may
not have a large effect depending on whether the factor
being managed is near a threshold or not.
Weakest link public-goods games (the general class of
problem to which collective invasive management
belongs) can give us some insight in to how such
complex systems might react to management interven-
tions. One general finding from weakest link public-
goods games is that there is an incentive to free ride. In a
weed control context this occurs because if an agent’s
neighbors control the weed: It lowers the invasion risk
for the agent and so they do not need to take
preventative action (Hennessy 2008). Payments, or
support to the agents with the least incentive to control
a weed, can encourage everyone in the group to control.
If everyone knows that the least motivated agents are
likely to control, then the best choice for everyone else is
also to control (Hennessy 2008). This sort of dynamic
suggests that weed prevalence should show a threshold
response to the number of unmotivated agents (paying
the least motivated agents is equivalent to reducing the
number of unmotivated agents). This is the pattern we
see, especially when unmotivated agents can have a large
effect due to more long-distance dispersal.
A second finding from weakest link games is that if a
member of the group puts in less effort early in the
game, then the strongly attracting equilibrium is for
everyone to put in the least amount of effort. There is
experimental evidence that peoples’ decisions not to put
in effort is mostly deterministic once trust in the group
has been broken (Knez and Camerer 1994). Thus, the
weed prevalence predicted by our model could be
optimistic when decision making is very random with
respect to benefit, because weakest link theory suggests
that once one neighbor refuses to control their weeds, an
agent should always choose not to control (i.e., act
deterministically). Balanced against this are numerous
anecdotal accounts of people who do control weeds,
despite their neighbors’ failure to do the same. Our
model may also over-predict coordination because the
agents are nonstrategic, being unable to predict and
respond to the possible future actions of their neighbors.
Strategic agents might free ride on their neighbors’
future decisions to be vigilant. A strategic agent could
decide not to be vigilant because they believe that future
increases in invasion risk will cause their neighbors’ to
become vigilant, reducing the agent’s invasion risk even
if they stay susceptible. This type of strategic free riding
will make agents less likely to take preventive action and
make coordinated action harder to achieve than is
predicted by our model. However, this type of strategic
behavior assumes that land managers have a good idea
of what the landscape will look like in the future and
how their neighbors will respond to that future.
One limitation of this work is that our results are
context dependent. Strong interactions between social
parameters, dispersal scenarios, and/or decision param-
eters, suggest that when management is decentralized,
weed invasion dynamics and opportunities for land-
scape-scale control will depend on the type of weed (e.g.,
how easy it is to eradicate, how much it reduces yield),
dispersal mode, the mix of production systems in a
landscape, and how decision makers perceive and react
to expected benefits. This context dependence was also
evident when comparing the mean field approximation
and simulation. In general, the mean field approxima-
tion did a good job of reproducing the results of the
simulation, but sometimes the two approaches produced
slightly different predictions, and there was no consis-
tent pattern as to when this would occur. There were
three differences between the mean field approximation
and simulation, the simulation was run in discrete time,
on a finite landscape, with stocasticity in agents’
decisions and infestation, while the mean field approx-
imation had continuous time, an infinite landscape, and
was deterministic. It is possible that different combina-
tions of these three factors contributed to each departure
between the mean field approximation and simulation
we found.
Finding general rules is difficult in a model with a
large number of interacting parts. One approach is to
develop a simplified analytical model, from which
generalizations can be drawn so long as the assumptions
of the model are met. Our failure to develop such an
analytical model (even the simplified mean field approx-
imation we developed could only be solved numerically)
does not mean that this problem is analytically
intractable. Tractable analytical models have been
developed for a similar class of problems in eutrophi-
cation and forest harvest (Iwasa et al. 2007, 2010, Satake
et al. 2007). We believe that developing an analytical
model for decentralized weed management is an
important goal for future research.
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Despite the contextual dependence of our results,
some general conclusions can be drawn. More damaging
weeds with effective control strategies will be controlled
by more decision makers and will spread less quickly
across the landscape. One or two land mangers that are
reluctant to control will not greatly increase weed
prevalence, but a small minority (ca. .10%) who are
unmotivated can affect the whole landscape if there is
long-distance dispersal. The way decision makers react
to expected benefits can have a large effect on the extent
of a weed because if all agents believe control is a good
idea and act on it, they tended to act synchronously,
reducing the pool of infested agents available to spread
the weed.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Appendix
Mean field approximation of the simulation (Ecological Archives A023-025-A1).
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